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THE LAST CENTRIFUGAL FORCE 
Robert F. Nagel* 
The Constitution of 1787 was debated against a backdrop of 
rebellion, defiance, and factionalism. Disintegration seemed al-
most a law of nature: 
... [I]n every political association which is formed upon the 
principle of uniting in a common interest a number of lesser 
sovereignties, there will be found a kind of eccentric tendency 
in the subordinate . . . orbs by the operation of which there 
will be a perpetual effort in each to fly off from the common 
center.l 
Proponents of the Constitution appealed to this centrifugal prin-
ciple not only in explaining the need for a stronger national gov-
ernment but also in minimizing the risks of centralization. 
Thus the authors of The Federalist argued that there was a 
greater likelihood that the states would encroach on national au-
thority than that the central government would usurp state au-
thority. Again invoking the laws of physics, they repeatedly 
urged that human affection is "weak in proportion to the distance 
or diffusiveness of the object." While "the strong propensities of 
the human heart would find powerful auxiliaries in the objects of 
State regulation," the operations of the national government 
would be less tangible and therefore "less likely to inspire an ha-
bitual sense of obligation .... " Supported by the loyalty of their 
citizens, states would be "at all times a complete counterpoise, 
and, not infrequently, dangerous rivals to the power of the 
Union." 
Not only would the natural affinities of the people provide 
pressure against nationalistic excesses, but state governments 
themselves would stand ready "to mark the innovation, to sound 
the alarm to the people. . . . " Indeed, once alerted, the people 
would be able-through their state governments-to create 
"plans of resistance," which ultimately would be backed by "trial 
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of force." To modem ears, of course, this reference to armed 
resistance sounds odd and unserious, but the argument is pur-
sued doggedly. The Federalist contains projections of the likely 
maximum number of soldiers in a national army (not more than 
"twenty-five or thirty thousand men") and envisions an encoun-
ter between that army and state militias "amounting to near half 
a million of citizens with arms in their hands .... " 
All this ferocious talk of conflict is easily ignored today; we 
are more inclined to notice the legal and institutional assurances 
than the arguments based on the psychology of loyalty and the 
methods of popular resistance. The more primitive bases for de-
centralization, however, must have seemed plausible to a people 
who had fought a war for independence and then lived through a 
period of political chaos. 
In any event, the authors of The Federalist turned out to be 
right, at least for much of our history. The centrifugal tendency 
was dramatically manifested in the great armed struggle over 
slavery and in the violent resistance to school desegregation. 
Less dramatically (and more appealingly), it can be seen in the 
continuing vitality of state and local governments. 
Nevertheless, it is now obvious that the federalists vastly un-
derestimated the forces that favor centralization. Their claim 
that the operations of the national government would involve 
relatively abstract matters unlikely to generate "affection, es-
teem, and reverence towards the government" ignores two of the 
most visible and potent powers of government, the power to 
make war and the power to spend public funds. Moreover, it is 
absurd to insist, as The Federalist does, that the tangible concerns 
of local government are a source of popular allegiance and that 
these concerns will hold only "slender allurements" for the ambi-
tions of national leaders. Even putting aside the obvious political 
incentives for invading areas of state regulation, there remains 
the great driving force of idealism. If the twentieth century holds 
no other lessons, it has emphatically taught that the rationalistic 
passion for engineered progress demands uniformity. Finally, 
when the Constitution was being debated, the logistics of the 
proposed national government were in doubt. Indeed, The Fed-
eralist contains a detailed calculation of that distance "which will 
... allow the representatives of the people to meet as often as 
may be necessary for the administration of public affairs." It 
goes without saying that many of the centrifugal forces that ex-
isted in that world simply do not exist in a country linked by air-
plane, television, and computer. 
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It is not surprising, then, that it has been impossible to con-
fine a strong national government to specific enumerated pow-
ers. Control over all that "variety of more minute interests" that 
the federalists assumed would remain local is now shared be-
tween the states and nation. So complete is the nationalization 
of our political culture that most modem scholars, confronted by 
this claim that the basic theory of power allocation in the Consti-
tution has been proven wrong, can be expected to ask only why 
anyone would care. 
Our present circumstance is this: At the same time that 
thousands of citizens routinely communicate their various opin-
ions to their representatives by fax or telephone or postcard, a 
large segment of the population does not feel sufficiently con-
nected with government to vote, let alone to participate in more 
sophisticated and costly ways. At the same time a presidential 
candidate thinks it appropriate to answer questions about his un-
derwear, government is seen as distant. At the same time that an 
endless supply of official standards, rules, and exceptions is rou-
tinely issued, government is seen as unresponsive. At the same 
time that decisionmaking authority has been shifted from the 
shadowy doorways of local legislatures to the elevated sanctums 
of Washington, the influence of special interests is believed to be 
pervasive and inexorable. 
The federalists told us this would not happen. Under their 
theory national representatives would be deliberative while state 
governments would keep policies aligned with "local circum-
stances." The Constitution would combine public spiritedness 
with responsiveness. But that theory assumed that the natural 
operation of centrifugal political forces would ensure that the 
objectives of national policy remained defined and limited. Now 
that the welfare of ordinary life is a concern of Washington, D.C., 
faction is combined with distance. Government can be both per-
sonal and remote, solicitous but unsatisfying. 
Given the powerful forces that have produced centraliza-
tion, it is doubtful that tinkering with constitutional text could 
significantly change our present circumstance. Adding the word 
"expressly" to the tenth amendment or narrowly defining "com-
merce among the states" would not alter any of the underlying 
realities. Institutional checks, such as the recurrent proposal to 
give state legislatures a veto over certain classes of federal legis-
lation, hold more promise. But the federalists were right that the 
people in the states will act as a counterpoise to federal power 
only if the popular will exists to utilize mechanisms of resistance. 
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By invoking the centrifugal principle, the proponents of the Con-
stitution largely presumed such a culture, but as a fallback they 
also argued that local resolve might be fortified if national poli-
cies were ineffective. This suggests the depressing conclusion 
that today even a modest movement toward a constitutional dis-
tribution of powers depends upon sustained ineptitude at the top. 
